Defaulty Logic

When is a default not a default? When to call it that might threaten the interests of significant financial players. Greece has arrived at the state of a default that may not speak its name. The announcement that it will add 'collective action clauses' to its sovereign debt removes any question-mark over whether a default is actually taking place. Voluntary agreement by lenders could be called by some other name, but when you explicitly refuse to pay back in full you are certainly in a state of default.

The danger in Greece's default is that it has automatic consequences. These arise as a result of a system of credit-default swaps (CDSs) which Greece's creditors took out to hedge their bets in a risky market. This piece of obfuscatory jargon hides the real nature of a CDS, which is an elaborate financial insurance scheme. Just as the creation of money through banking relies on the acceptance of non-existent money from one institution by the next, so the financial institutions insured each other against the absurd risks they were taking on in lending money to countries, and individuals, who could never afford to pay it back. In this way interconnections were built up that guaranteed that the failure of one would be the failure of all—and incidentally made it inevitable that if we are to solve the problem of any one country or bank we must radically redesign the whole system.

The Greek default has been more extreme than even the most pessimistic observers expected. Creditors are expected to face 65% to 70% losses on their loans, and the new conditions mean that the Greek government will not negotiate but will impose these terms. But the way that they have, without any system of accountability, sucked workers and savers into the web of greed and deceit means that it will be us, rather than bank shareholders, who will pay for the Greek default.
. Tweet

The Silent Coup

For some time I have been worried about the political consequences of the social unrest in some of the Mediterranean countries whose history of democracy is limited and whose political cultures are unstable. I had been watching out for action by their militaries to quell street protests or a greater role for the military in political life.

But during the past few days I have realised my foolishness. The coups are happening in an entirely civilised way, carried out by men in suits rather than men in fatigues. An online dictionary defines a coup as 'The sudden overthrow of a government by a usually small group of persons in or previously in positions of authority.' In the case of democracies it can be taken to mean the replacement of one government with another without recourse to elections.

The first evidence that this was becoming the preferred strategy of the financial elites came with the removal of Papandreou when he had the effrontery to announce that such a major decision as subjecting his people to financial rule by the IMF would require their agreement through a referendum. Within 24 hours he had been ousted and today we hear he is to be replaced by Papademos, who is being politely referred to as a 'technocrat' but whose banking credentials are the reason for his appointment.

As a former vice-president of the European Central Bank he is considered a safe pair of hands by the holders of financial assets. Since he is not a member of the socialist party, who won a majority at the last election, he could hardly become the leader of such a government. In Orwellian style, the government is to be titled one of 'national unity'. In an affront to democracy Greece will now be led by a man who has never held elected office.

Italy also seems to be lurching its way towards a 'government of national unity' again headed by an unelected banker. Last evening Mario Monti was made a senator for life by Italy's President, a step seen as preparatory to his taking over as Prime Minister. He is a former politician and was European Commissioner for the single market, which included the finance brief. The total of governments that have fallen as a result of the financial crisis has now risen to five. As the financial elites jostle to protect their ill-gotten assets the main loser appears to be democracy.

The lack of democracy in our own country is blatant and was the real cause of the expenses scandal. Charging to stand in elections and the continuing and growing bias in the media against any views that question the capitalist status quo is a threat to democracy. But in May 2010 voters did have other choices: their refusal to take them is entirely different from citizens who are being prevented from making democratic choices that might cause a loss in the value of assets being held by the elite, as we are seeing in Italy and Greece.
. Tweet

Stability Facility Two-Step Reaches Conclusion

After weeks of rising political rhetoric the outline of a plan for the Eurozone appears to be emerging. The road that involved further debt guarantees from the wealthier nations of the EU, primarily Germany, and a consolidation of all Eurozone debts into one Eurobond, appears to have been abandoned. This was presumably because Chancellor Merkel refused, or argued successfully that this was politically impossible and might lead to a less market-friendly government in her country—perhaps even a Green one.

Since the debts cannot be absorbed the new plan is that some will be turned into losses, with a negotiation between the banks that unwisely took on Greek bonds and the Greek government that cannot repay them: the so-called hair-cut, which is now moving down to a number 2 on that automatic machine that muscular men with early hair loss so often favour. It was the Argentinians back in 2002 who taught us that it takes two to tango: serious debt crises require losses to creditors as well as pain to debtors.

The other side of the plan is more interesting: a larger bailout pot, now tastefully renamed the European Fiscal Stability Facility. This will be available to support governments whose national debt is so large as to undermine market confidence. It is assumed that it will never be used: its existence is intended to be enough to underpin confidence. This means it will have to be a very large pot indeed. And once the money is in the pot you can guarantee that the financial market makes will find some way to provoke a crisis and make it their own.

The argument now seems to be about where the money will come from to fill the pot. We must keep very close attention on this. If the money comes from national governments then our obvious question should be: 'How can there be money to put into a bailout pot when there is no money to pay for hospitals or children's services?' If, alternatively, the money is created directly by central banks—in a process akin to quantitative easing—then our question should be: 'Why not create enough money this way to repay all the national debt and so remove the need for the pain of spending cuts?'

This is the most interesting question of all. We know that the Bank of England is under pressure to quease more money into the economy at any time. Some of that money has previously been spent buying back our own debt; a similar process has been undertaken by the European Central Bank to buy Italian debt. So why not go the whole hog? Could it be that this would make it clear that there really is no need to create money as debt in the first place? That money could be directly spent into the economy as needed. The reason for resisting this is the power of those who live by lending money: without debt they would have to go to work like the rest of us.
. Tweet